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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate the relationship between underwriter reputation and earnings management of IPO 
firms over the period of 1991-2005. We find that IPO firms engage in less earnings management if 
they are underwritten by prestigious investment bankers. Furthermore, the role of prestigious 
underwriters in restraining earnings management of IPO issuers do not change during the 
Internet Bubble period or after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The findings support 
the certification role of underwriters in the IPO process.  We also document that firms going 
public in the post-SOX period engage in less earnings management compared to firms going 
public in the pre-SOX period. Further findings suggest that the changing objectives of venture 
capitalists may explain the reduction in the level of earnings management of IPO firms following 
the passage of SOX. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
arnings management of initial public offering issuers is a great concern to investors due to their 
information disadvantage regarding the quality of the issuers. Investors rely on information, especially 
reported earnings, presented in the offering prospectus to assess the quality and value of an initial 
public offering (IPO) (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). Since IPO issuers’ earnings and their peers’ price-earnings ratios 
are used to determine the offer price, issuers could be motivated to manipulate their reported and projected earnings 
to boost the offer prices for larger proceeds. Empirical evidence shows that earnings management of IPO firms does 
not align with investors’ interests. IPO firms that engage in income-increasing earnings management through 
opportunistic accrual choices underperform their peers in both post-issue earnings performance and post-issue stock 
returns (Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh et al., 1998b; DuCharme et al., 2001).  DuCharme et al. (2004) report that the 
incidence and the settlement of shareholder lawsuits involving stock offerings increase with the level of 
discretionary accruals around the issuance.
1
 Thus, it is in the interest of less informed investors to seek assistance in 
detecting the earnings management and hence the quality and value of IPO issuers. 
 
Investment bankers, who act as underwriters, and venture capitalists (VCs), who act as private equity 
investors, of IPO firms could play important roles in restraining earnings management. However, existing empirical 
findings on their roles in restraining earnings management of IPO issuers are mixed. Aharony et al. (1993) report a 
weak inverse relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management, while Morsfield and Tan (2006) 
find a significant inverse relation. Besides, Morsfield and Tan find a significant role of VCs in restraining earnings 
management, but Lee and Masulis (2011) do not report a similarly significant role for venture capitalists as a group. 
However, they find that a significantly lower level of earnings management among IPOs that are underwritten by 
                                                 
1 Various terms, such as discretionary accruals, abnormal accruals, and unexpected accruals, are used in the literature to describe 
earnings management through managers’ accrual choices. We use discretionary accruals throughout the paper for consistency. 
E 
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prestigious investment bankers and are backed by reputable venture capitalists.   Hence, the literature calls for 
further research on the roles of underwriters and venture capitalists in restraining earnings management of IPO 
issuers. 
 
In the past two decades, the IPO market has gone through profound changes due to the Internet bubble in 
late 1990s and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Ritter and Welch (2002) report that issuing 
volume, average first-day returns, and long-run underperformance of IPO issuing firms peaked during the Internet 
bubble period, and then sharply declined following the burst of the bubble. Elstrom (2001), Loughran and Ritter 
(2004), and Agrawal and Cooper (2010) suggest that investment bankers lower their standards by taking public an 
increasing number of low quality IPO issuers for enormous fees. This results in the unusual volume and 
underpricing of IPOs during the Internet bubble period. These findings suggest that the changing practice of 
underwriters may undermine their role in monitoring earnings management of IPO firms during the Internet boom.  
 
In contrast, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been documented to reduce earnings management of 
firms. Cohen et al. (2008) document that accrual-based earnings management increased steadily from 1987 until the 
passage of the SOX in 2002, followed by a significant decline afterwards. Iliev (2010) finds that SOX led to 
conservative reported earnings. However, there is a void in the literature concerning possible changes in the role of 
underwriters in restraining earnings management of IPO firms post SOX.  
 
In this study, we examine the influence of underwriter reputation in earnings management of IPO issuers 
over an extended period of 1991 to 2005. More importantly, we investigate whether the effectiveness of reputable 
underwriters in restraining earnings management has changed during the Internet boom and following the passage of 
SOX. In our analysis, we control for and examine the role of venture capitalists in restraining earnings management 
of IPO issuers, especially in the Internet bubble period and in the post-SOX era.    
 
Consistent with Morsfield and Tan (2006) and Lee and Masulis (2011), we also document a significantly 
negative relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management of IPO firms, after controlling for 
known factors that impact earnings management. The finding that firms taken public by prestigious underwriters 
manage earnings less aggressively than their peers suggests a unique role of underwriters in mitigating earnings 
management in IPOs, and supports the notion that prestigious underwriters serve as a certifying agent for the quality 
of the issuing firm, i.e., the underwriter certification hypothesis. Consistent with Lee and Masulis (2011), we do not 
find a significant role for venture capitalists as a group in restraining earnings management of IPO issuers.      
 
Second, we do not find significant changes in the impact of prestigious underwriters on earnings 
management of IPO issuers during the Internet bubble period or in the post–SOX era. The results suggest that 
prestigious underwrites have played a consistent role in restraining earnings management of IPO issuers, despite 
material changes in the market and regulatory environments. In contrast, we find that VC backed IPO issuers 
engaged in more earnings management during the Internet bubble period but engaged in less earnings management 
post SOX. The results suggest that VCs may be driven by their motive to realize windfall investment returns during 
the Internet boom, but strengthen their monitoring role after the passage of SOX. 
 
In addition, we find that IPO issuers pursue a significantly lower level of earnings management after the 
passage of SOX. The finding is consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), though their sample is not limited to IPO firms. 
However, we do not find significant difference in earnings management by IPO firms between the Internet bubble 
period and non-bubble period.  
 
Our study contributes to the literature in several folds: first, our results show that underwriter reputation, in 
contrast to VC backing, plays a consistent and effective role in restraining earnings management of IPO firms. 
Second, we thoroughly investigate possible changes in the roles of underwriters and venture capitalists in restraining 
earnings management of IPO firms over time. Finally, we provide new evidence on the earnings management of IPO 
firms during the Internet bubble period and after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.     
 
In the next section, we review the literature on the certification role of underwriters. Section 3 constructs 
the measures of earnings management and describes the sample selection.  Section 4 develops models that test the 
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relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management and presents the empirical results.  Finally, 
Section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes the study. 
 
2.  THE CERTIFICATION ROLE OF UNDERWRITERS  
 
Reputable underwriters help mitigate the information asymmetry problem by serving as the credible agent 
certifying the quality of IPO issuers. Previous research shows that prestigious underwriters are more effective in 
mitigating the adverse impact of information asymmetry in the equity market, resulting in better post-issue stock 
price performance for high quality IPO issuers (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Carter et al., 1998; McLaughlin et 
al., 2000). From the issuer’s perspective, McLaughlin et al. (2000) suggest that hiring a less reputable underwriter 
conveys a bad signal to the market that is associated with greater underpricing. As such, quality IPO issuers with 
less incentive for earnings management select prestigious underwriters to convey a favorable signal to the market. 
Hence, we expect an inverse relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management of IPO firms. 
 
Besides, underwriters, who are repeated players in the competitive underwriting market, concern about the 
value of their reputation capital (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). If they lower their 
standards by taking low quality IPO issuers with aggressive earnings management, they may suffer litigation and 
reputation costs of being co-defendants in class action lawsuits from disgruntled investors if the malpractice is 
unraveled afterwards (DuCharme et al., 2004). Class action lawsuits will damage underwriters’ reputation and hurt 
their underwriting businesses and firm values in the long-run. In particular, prestigious underwriters generally invest 
substantial efforts to build up their reputation by successfully taking quality issuers public over time. Hence, they 
incur higher reputation costs for underwriting a lower quality IPO to gain short-term benefits than their less 
reputable peers. Consequently, prestigious underwriters would have greater incentives to discern earnings 
management of low quality IPO firms (Logue et al., 2002). Moreover, prestigious underwriters are inclined to work 
with high-quality issuers to reduce potential damage to their reputation. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) document 
that prestigious underwriters prefer to underwrite low risk firms. Fang (2005) shows that investment banks’ 
underwriting decisions reflect reputation concerns and thus signal issue quality. Thus, an inverse relation between 
earnings management and underwriter reputation in the IPOs is expected.  
 
In the underwriting process, investment bankers must perform “due diligence” investigation that closely 
examines the completeness and accuracy of information about the issuer’s financial conditions and prospects. 
Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) suggest that underwriters’ monitoring can reduce agency problems and improve the 
performance of issuing firms. In particular, prestigious underwriters possess better resources and superior 
professional expertise and experience, thereby more likely to perform effective monitoring function than their less 
reputable peers. As such, prestigious underwriters are more capable to restrain earnings management of IPO issuers. 
On the other hand, IPO issuers that heavily manage earnings are reluctant to hire prestigious underwriters to avoid 
revealing their true quality. The monitoring function of underwriters thus predicts a negative relation between 
underwriter reputation and earnings management of IPO firms as well. 
 
3. DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
3.1 Measures of Earnings Management and Underwriter Reputation  
 
In this study, we use the performance-matched discretionary accruals
2
 to measure earnings management. 
As pointed out by Kothari et al. (2005), performance-matched discretionary accruals are more reliable than 
traditional measures of discretionary accruals because they mitigate the bias in the estimation of treatment effects, 
which is induced by non-random samples. As in Kothari et al. (2005), we estimate discretionary accruals with the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). We first compute total accruals (TACC) of IPO firms in the fiscal year 
                                                 
2 Reported earnings are composed of cash flows from operations and accruals. Because it is more difficult to manipulate cash 
flows, managers tend to manage accruals for earnings management. Accruals are further divided into two types - (i) 
nondiscretionary accruals that vary with sales and depreciation and hence offer limited room for manipulation in their 
calculation; and (ii) discretionary accruals that are the main source of earnings management. 
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of going public as follows:
3
 
 
1
( ) /
it it it it
TACC NI OCF TA

  ,                                                                        (1) 
 
where 
it
TACC  = total accruals for firm i in IPO year t; 
 
it
NI = net income for firm i in IPO year t; 
 
it
OCF = operating cash flow for firm i in IPO year t; 
 
1it
TA

= total assets for firm i in pre-IPO year t-1. 
 
Next, we employ the modified Jones model to separate discretionary accruals from nondiscretionary accruals.  That 
is, 
 
1 1 2 1 3 1
(1/ ) ( ) / /
it it it it it it it it
TACC TA REV REC TA PPE TA   
  
      ,                                                (2) 
 
where  
it
REV = change in revenue for firm i in IPO year t; 
 
it
REC = change in receivables for firm i in IPO year t; 
 
it
PPE = property, plant and equipment for firm i in IPO year t. 
 
In equation (2), the difference between the change in revenue (
it
REV ) and the change in receivables (
it
REC ) 
captures the normal level of working capital accruals. The property, plant and equipment (
it
PPE ) controls for the 
normal level of depreciation expense and related deferred tax accruals. To mitigate the effect of common industry 
factors on the estimation of discretionary accruals, we run a separate cross-sectional regression for each two-digit 
SIC industry for each year.  We require at least ten observations per year for each industry.  Non-discretionary 
accruals are the fitted values of equation (2).  The residuals of the regression are discretionary accruals (DACC).  
That is, 
 
1 1 2 1 3 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ(1/ ) ( ) / /
it it it it it it it it
DACC TACC TA REV REC TA PPE TA  
  
      ,                                       (3) 
 
where 
1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ,  and     are the parameters estimated from equation (2). 
 
Following Kothari et al. (2005), we match each IPO firm with a non-IPO firm that has the closest return on 
assets (ROA) in the same two-digit SIC industry and year, where ROA is net income divided by lagged total assets. 
The ROA matching is done in the same year for which the discretionary accruals are calculated. The performance-
matched discretionary accruals are the difference in the modified Jones model discretionary accruals calculated for 
each IPO firm and its matched firm.
4
 
                                                 
3 We follow Teoh et al. (1998a) to calculate accruals variables by using both pre-IPO and post-IPO financial data. To calculate 
pre-IPO accruals, we need two years of financial data preceding the IPO. This data requirement leads to severe missing data 
problem. Teoh et al. argue that management continues to have strong incentive to manage earnings after IPO because of their 
concerns of lawsuits and lock-up agreements. DuCharme et al. (2004) and Jo and Kim (2007) show that similar incentives exist 
for seasoned equity offerings. Therefore, it is reasonable to use both pre-IPO and post-IPO financial data to measure earnings 
management.     
4 Here is an illustration of our calculation of the performance matched discretionary current accruals - Assume that IPO Company 
A’s discretionary current accruals were 0.008 and the two-digit SIC code was 31 for 1996 during which it went public.  Non-IPO 
Company B had the same two-digit SIC code as Company A and had the closest ROA to Company A’s ROA among all non-IPO 
firms with the same 2-digit SIC code in 1996. Company B’s discretionary current accruals were 0.006 for 1996. Then, the 
performance matched discretionary current accruals were 0.002 for Company A in 1996. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2012 Volume 28, Number 4 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  713 
In terms of underwriter reputation, we define high-prestige underwriter as lead underwriters who have a 
Carter-Manaster underwriter rank (Carter et al., 1998) of eight or higher on their nine-point scale, and low-prestige 
underwriter otherwise.
5
 The dummy variable, BANKER, takes a value of one for high-prestige underwriter, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
3.2 Sample Construction and Description 
 
We obtain an initial sample of 6,931 firms that went public during the period of 1991-2005 from the 
Thomson Financial SDC New Issues database. We exclude financial services and utility issuers because they have 
different financial disclosure requirements, and are heavily regulated. We also exclude issuers with total assets less 
than one million dollars to migrate the small size effect, and issuers that do not have underwriter rank data and/or 
financial data from the COMPUSTAT database. Our final sample includes 2,880 IPO firms.  
 
Table 1 presents the distribution of IPOs by industry, which is defined with the two-digit SIC codes, with 
further partition into subsamples of IPOs underwritten by high- and low- prestige underwriters. The distribution 
indicates industry clustering among IPO issuers, with a concentration in the computer, electronics, and chemical 
industries. For instance, computer services and software industry alone accounts for 26% of the sample. Chemical 
products and electronics industries comprise 18% of the sample. Moreover, prestigious investment bankers, in 
general, underwrite more IPOs in most industries, especially in the clustering industries. In total, reputable 
investment bankers underwrite 1,898 IPOs, compared to only 982 IPOs underwritten by less reputable investment 
bankers.   
 
 
Table 1: IPO Issuers by Industry 
This table describes the industry distribution of IPO firms during the sample period of 1991 to 2005. The total number of sample 
firms is 2880. BANKER proxies for underwriter reputation and takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s underwriter has a 
rank of 8 or above on the Loughran and Ritter (2004) 9-point scale.  
Industry Codes Number of Companies 
   BANKER = 1 BANKER = 0 Total 
Oil and Gas 13 47 23 70 
Food Products 20 31 23 54 
Paper and Paper Products 24-27 44 29 73 
Chemical Products 28 163 65 228 
Manufacturing 30-34 69 43 112 
Machinery & Computer Equipment  35 129 78 207 
Electronic Equipment 36 201 84 285 
Transportation 37,39 45 53 98 
Scientific Instruments 38 162 79 241 
Durable Goods 50 34 43 77 
Retail 53-57,59 145 63 208 
Eating and Drinking Establishments 58 26 30 56 
Entertainment Services 70,78,79 32 33 65 
Computer Services and Software 73 542 195 737 
Health 80 59 31 90 
All others 
1,10,14,15,16,17,21, 169 110 279 
22,23,29,51,52,72,    
75,76,82,83,87,99    
Total  1,898 982 2,880 
 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The mean and median levels of 
earnings management, measured by discretionary accruals (DACC), are 2.1% and 0.7%, respectively.  The mean 
and median values of the underwriter reputation variable, BANKER, are 0.66 and 1.00, respectively, i.e., two-thirds 
of our sample IPOs is underwritten by prestigious investment bankers. The two dummy variables, AUDIT and VC, 
                                                 
5 The updated list of the Carter-Manaster ranking is available on Professor Jay Ritter’s website.  
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proxy the auditor reputation and VC backing, respectively. If the auditor is a Big Five accounting (Big 5) firm, 
AUDIT equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If an IPO is backed by a venture capitalist, VC equals 1, and 0 otherwise. The 
mean and median AUDIT are, respectively, 0.90 and 1.00, but the mean and median VC are 0.45 and 0.00, 
respectively.  These statistics indicate that most of our sample IPOs are audited by Big 5 firms, but less than half of 
them are VC backed. 
 
Other variables, which are also known for impacting the level of earnings management (Sweeney, 1994; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Becker et al., 1998), include the offer size
6
, which is proxied by the log of total 
proceeds (Off_Size); the absolute value of total accruals as a percentage of lagged total assets (Abstacc); the 
leverage ratio (Lev), which is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets; and two dummy variables, Incchg 
and Loss. The Incchg dummy equals 1 if current year’s income before discretionary accruals is less than previous 
year’s income, and 0 otherwise. The Loss dummy equals 1 if current year’s income before discretionary accruals is 
negative, and 0 otherwise. These two dummy variables capture the incentive of IPO issuers to report increases in 
income, and their incentive to report a profit by managing discretionary accruals, respectively.  
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
This table reports the summary statistics of the selected variables. DACC is discretionary accruals in the year of the IPO scaled by 
lagged total assets. BANKER proxies for underwriter reputation and takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s underwriter has a 
rank of 8 or above on the Loughran and Ritter (2004) 9-point scale. AUDIT takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s auditor is 
a member of the Big Five accounting firms. VC takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists. 
Proceed is the total proceeds received from IPOs. Off_Size is the natural log of total proceeds. Abstacc is the absolute value of 
total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. Incchg takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if current year’s income before discretionary 
accruals is less than previous year’s level. Loss takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if current year’s income before discretionary 
accruals is less than zero. Lev is the leverage of a firm and is defined as total liabilities over total assets.  
  Mean Median First Quartile Third Quartile Standard Deviation 
DACC 0.021 0.007 -0.145 0.185 0.377 
BANKER 0.659 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.474 
AUDIT 0.899 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.301 
VC 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.498 
Proceed($MM) 66.97 35.20 18.00 66.25 175.12 
Off_Size 3.535 3.561 2.890 4.193 1.065 
Abstacc 0.262 0.148 0.063 0.350 0.305 
Incchg 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.297 
Loss 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 
Lev 0.349 0.285 0.159 0.490 0.255 
 
 
The summary statistics reported in Table 2 indicate that sample firms raise an average amount of $66.97 
million from their initial public offerings, with average absolute total accruals that account for 26.2% of their lagged 
total assets, and have an average debt ratio of 34.9%. On average, 9.8% of IPO firms experience decreases in 
income before discretionary accruals during the issuance year, and 0.4% of them experience losses in the year of 
going public.   
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
 We report preliminary results on the role of underwriters in restraining earnings management of IPO issuers 
by presenting the comparison of earnings management based on underwriter reputation and VC backing in Table 3. 
Panels A and B compare means of discretionary accruals between the following groups: high-prestige underwriters 
versus low-prestige underwriters, and VC backing versus non-VC backing. The results show that the mean of 
discretionary accruals of IPO firms that are underwritten by high-prestige underwriters (BANKER=1), -1.8%, is 
                                                 
6 While the issuer’s size is also used to control for the effect of firm size on earnings management, we follow the IPO literature to 
use offer size instead in order to mitigate the missing data problem in the analysis.   
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significantly lower than that of those underwritten by low-prestige underwriters (BANKER=0), 9.6%. However, the 
mean discretionary accruals of IPO firms backed by VCs (VC=1), 0.8%, is not significantly different from that of 
the non-VC backed sample (VC=0), 3.1%.  
 
Second, prestigious underwriters tend to pair up with reputable auditors in the IPO process. Panel A 
indicates that 96.7% of IPO issues underwritten by prestigious investment bankers (BANKER=1) are audited by Big 
Five accounting firms, compared to only 76.8% of those IPOs underwritten by low-prestige underwriters 
(BANKER=0). Similarly, Panel C reports that VC backed IPO issuers prefer to hire prestigious underwriters and 
quality auditors. For IPOs that are backed by venture capitalists (VC=1), 77.4% of the issues underwritten by 
prestigious investment bankers and 97.6% are audited by Big 5 firms, respectively, compared to 56.5% and 83.7%, 
respectively, for the non-VC backed sample. The results suggest that underwriter reputation, auditor quality, and VC 
backing are positively correlated.  
 
 
Table 3: Comparisons of the Selected Variables 
This table reports comparisons of the selected variables between different groups. DACC is discretionary accruals in the year of 
the IPO scaled by lagged total assets. BANKER proxies for underwriter reputation and takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the 
IPO’s underwriter has a rank of 8 or above on the Loughran and Ritter 9-point (2004) scale. AUDIT takes a value of 1 (0 
otherwise) if the IPO’s auditor is a member of the Big Five accounting firms. VC takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO is 
backed by venture capitalists. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on two-sided 
tests.   
Panel A: Comparisons of the Selected Variables for High-prestige vs. Low-prestige Underwriters 
Statistics Mean 
  BANKER = 1 BANKER = 0 t-Statistics 
DACC -0.018 0.096 7.69*** 
AUDIT 0.967 0.768 -14.17*** 
VC 0.528 0.298 -12.36*** 
No. of Obs. 1,898 982  
 
Panel B: Comparisons of the Selected Variables for VC-backed IPOs vs. Non VC-backed IPOs 
Statistics Mean 
  VC = 1 VC = 0 t-Statistics 
DACC 0.008 0.031 1.63 
BANKER 0.774 0.565 -12.23*** 
AUDIT 0.976 0.837 -13.65*** 
No. of Obs. 1,295 1,585  
 
 
Overall, the univariate results show a significantly negative relation between earnings management of IPO 
firms and underwriter reputation. On the other hand, the results do not show a significant relation between VC 
backing and the level of earnings management. Also, the correlations among underwriter reputation, auditor quality 
and VC backing highlight the need to control for the potential roles of auditors and venture capitalists in the 
examination of the role of underwriter reputation in restraining earnings management of IPO issuers. 
 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis of Earnings Management and Underwriter Reputation  
 
 We use the following regression model to examine the role of underwriter reputation in restraining earnings 
management of IPO issuers over the entire sample period.  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6
_ +
                 .
it it it it it it
it it
DACC BANKER Off Size Abstacc Incchg Loss
Lev Industry dummies
     
 
    
  
                                      (4) 
 
Since Table 1 suggests industry clustering among our sample IPOs, we include industry dummies as 
grouped by two-digit SIC codes to control for the fixed industry effects. Table 4 reports the parameter estimates and 
t statistics for various versions of the regression model. Model (A), i.e., Equation (4), shows that the coefficient for 
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BANKER is -4.7% and significant at 1% level, indicating that the discretionary accruals of IPO firms decline by 
4.7% if the IPOs are underwritten by high-prestige underwriters, after controlling for the effects of other variables 
that are known for impacting the level of earnings management. The significantly negative BANKER coefficient 
thus supports the notion of the underwriter certification hypothesis. 
 
The effects of the control variables on earnings management are in line with those documented in the 
literature. For instance, the coefficient estimates of the absolute value of total accruals (Abstacc) and offer size 
(Off_size) variables are negative and significant at the 1% level, echoing the findings of Becker et al. (1998) and 
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981). Similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), we document that firms reporting a 
decrease in earnings (Incchg) are significantly more aggressive in their earnings management. Consistent with Lee 
and Masulis (2011), we do not find a significant relation between earnings management of IPO issuers and leverage. 
Overall, the set of explanatory variables jointly explains 7.38% of variation in discretionary accruals.     
 
Model (B) in Table 4 replaces the BANKER variable with the VC variable to examine the effect of VC 
backing on restraining earnings management of IPO firms. Consistent with Lee and Masulis (2011), the insignificant 
coefficient of -1.1% suggests that venture capitalists as a group does not significantly restrain earnings management 
of IPO issuers.   
 
 
Table 4: Multivariate Analysis of the Relation between Underwriter Reputation and Earnings Management by IPO Firms 
This table reports results of relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management by performing multivariate 
regression analysis. The dependent variable is DACC that stands for discretionary accruals in the year of the IPO scaled by 
lagged total assets. BANKER proxies for underwriter reputation and takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s underwriter has a 
rank of 8 or above on the Loughran and Ritter (2004) 9-point scale. AUDIT takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s auditor is 
a member of the Big Five accounting firms. VC takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists. 
Off_Size is the natural log of total proceeds. Abstacc is the absolute value of total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. Incchg 
takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if current year’s income before discretionary accruals is less than previous year’s level. Loss 
takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if current year’s income before discretionary accruals is less than zero. Lev is the leverage of a 
firm and is defined as total liabilities over total assets. Industry dummies are grouped by two-digit SIC codes and have 48 in total.  
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on two-sided tests.   
Explanatory Variables Model (A) Model (B) Model (C) 
     
Constant 0.164 0.175 0.167 
(1.00) (1.06) (1.01) 
BANKER -0.047***  -0.046** 
(-2.67)  (-2.53) 
AUDIT    -0.004 
  (-0.15) 
VC  -0.011 -0.002 
 (-0.74) (-0.12) 
Off_Size -0.041*** -0.052*** -0.041*** 
(-5.10) (-7.67) (-4.97) 
Abstacc -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.209*** 
(-8.91) (-8.89) (-8.89) 
Incchg 0.195*** 0.199*** 0.194*** 
(7.81) (7.99) (7.76) 
Loss -0.024 -0.024 -0.025 
 (-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.19) 
Lev -0.038 -0.038 -0.039 
 (-1.29) (-1.26) (-1.30) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 7.38% 7.17% 7.32% 
 
 
Since the univariate results reported in Table 3 suggest positive correlations among underwriter reputation, 
auditor quality, and venture capitalists in the IPO process, we expand our multivariate analysis to include the 
AUDIT and VC dummies in the regression model to control for their possible effects on earnings management of 
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IPO issuers: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
_
                 +  .
it it it it it it
it it it it
DACC BANKER AUDIT VC Off Size Abstacc
Incchg Loss Lev Industry dummies
     
   
     
   
                                       (5)  
 
Model (C) of Table 4, i.e., Equation (5), indicates that the significant negative relation between earnings 
management and underwriter reputation persists after controlling for the effects of auditor quality and VC backing. 
On the other hand, auditor quality and VC backing do not show significant impacts on reducing earnings 
management, which is consistent with Lee and Masulis (2011). The persistent role of underwriter reputation in 
restraining earnings management of IPO issuers is also evidenced by the comparable magnitude of the coefficients 
of the BANKER variable in Models (C) and (A).     
 
4.3 Changing Roles of Underwriters and Venture Capitalists over Time 
 
Several studies (Elstrom, 2001; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Agrawal and Cooper, 2010) note that 
investment bankers and venture capitalists relaxed their standards in underwriting and backing IPO issues during the 
Internet bubble period, which may result in greater tolerance for earnings management of IPO issuers. Following the 
burst of the Internet bubble and the revelation of numerous corporate scandals, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) in 2002 tightens the oversight and regulations of public companies and capital market professionals, 
which probably strengthens the incentives of underwriters and venture capitalists to restrain earnings management of 
issuing firms. The changing practices of underwriters and venture capitalists, as well as changes in the regulatory 
environment, suggest that the roles of underwriters and venture capitalists in restraining earnings management of 
IPO issuers may revolve over time.  
 
 
Table 5: Comparison of Selected Variables Over Time 
This table reports comparisons of the selected variables over time. DACC is discretionary accruals in the year of the IPO scaled 
by lagged total assets. BANKER proxies for underwriter reputation and takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s underwriter 
has a rank of 8 or above on the Loughran and Ritter (2004) 9-point scale. AUDIT takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s 
auditor is a member of the Big Five accounting firms. VC takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO is backed by venture 
capitalists. Net takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the issuing date is between 1996 and March 2000. SOX takes a value of 1 (0 
otherwise) if the issuing date is between 2002 and 2005. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels based on two-sided tests.   
Panel A: Comparisons of the Selected Variables for Internet Bubble Period vs. Non Bubble Period 
Statistics Mean 
  Net = 1 Net = 0 t-Statistics 
DACC 0.027 0.016 -0.78 
BANKER 0.683 0.641 -2.36** 
AUDIT 0.897 0.901 0.34 
VC 0.421 0.472 2.72*** 
No. of Obs. 1,254 1,628  
 
Panel B: Comparisons of the Selected Variables for Post-SOX vs. Pre-SOX 
Statistics Mean 
  SOX = 1 SOX = 0 t-Statistics 
DACC -0.032 0.024 2.15** 
BANKER 0.705 0.656 -1.44 
AUDIT 0.874 0.901 1.10 
VC 0.584 0.440 -3.88*** 
No. of Obs. 190 2,690  
 
 
We first examine the earnings management pattern of IPOs over time by comparing the means of a set of 
selected variables over the Internet bubble period versus the non-bubble period, as well as between the post-SOX 
period and the pre-SOX period, and report the results in Table 5. The Internet bubble period covers 1996 through 
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March 2000, and the post-SOX period covers 2002 to 2005. Table 5 reports that the mean of discretionary accruals 
of IPO firms during the Internet bubble period (2.7%) is not significantly different from that during the non-bubble 
period (1.6%). However, the mean of the BANKER variable for the bubble period (0.683) is significantly higher 
than that for the non-bubble period (0.641). The mean of the VC backing variable over the bubble period (0.421) is 
significantly lower than that over the non-bubble period (0.472). The results presented in Panel A suggest that there 
were more firms underwritten by prestigious investment bankers but fewer firms backed by venture capitals when 
they went public during the bubble period compared to those went public in the non-bubble period.   
 
In contrast, Panel B reports that the mean discretionary accruals in the post-SOX period (-3.2%) is 
significantly lower than that in the pre-SOX period (2.4%), suggesting a tightening of earnings management among 
IPO issuers following the passage of SOX. Besides, the fraction of VC backed IPOs in the post-SOX era (0.584) is 
significantly higher than that before the passage of SOX (0.440). The increasing backing of venture capitalists might 
have helped reduce the level of earnings management of IPO issuers. On the other hand, there is no significant 
difference in the fraction of IPOs underwritten by prestigious investment bankers surrounding the SOX.  
 
In sum, the univariate results reported in Table 5 suggest that the roles of underwriter and venture 
capitalists in restraining earnings management by IPO issuers may change during the Internet bubble period and 
after the passage of SOX. Hence, we use the following regression model to examine the possible changing 
monitoring roles of underwriters and venture capitalists over the internet bubble cycle: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10
_
               +  ,                
it it it it it it
it it it it it
DACC BANKER AUDIT VC Net BAV Net Off Size
Abstacc Incchg Loss Lev Industry dummies
      
    
       
    
                 (6) 
 
where BAV stands for BANKER or VC; Net is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the IPO date is between 1996 
and March 2000
7
, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Model (A) in Table 6 reports the estimates of the regression model with the interaction term of underwriter 
reputation with Net. The coefficient for BANKER is -4.0% and significant at the 10% level, indicating that 
underwriter reputation helps restrain the level of earnings management of IPO firms by 4.0% during the non-bubble 
period. While underwriter reputation further reduces earnings management during the Internet bubble period, the 
insignificant coefficient of the interaction term, BANKER*NET, suggests that the incremental effect is limited. The 
statistically significant positive coefficient of the Net variable indicates that there is an increase in the level of 
earnings management for IPO issuers underwritten by less reputable underwriters during the Internet bubble. This 
suggests that less reputable underwriters may have lowered their standards by taking low quality firms public during 
the Internet bubble period.  
 
Model (B) in Table 6 shows that venture capitalists generally play a minor role in restraining earnings 
management of IPO issuers during the non-bubble period. It is interesting to note that the magnitude of the 
significantly positive coefficient for the interaction term, VC*Net, is larger than that of the insignificant negative 
coefficient of the VC variable. The net of the two coefficients, 3.3% (β3 + β5), indicates that VC-backed IPO issuers 
engage in more earnings management than their non-VC-backed peers during the Internet boom. This finding 
suggests that venture capitalists may have lowered their monitoring standards on earnings management of IPO 
issuers during the Internet bubble period.     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 While there is a general consensus among researchers that March 2000 was the ending point of the Internet bubble, there is no 
consensus for the starting point, with 1996, 1997, and 1998 being the popular versions. We also use 1997 and 1998, respectively, 
as the starting point of Internet Bubble period in our analysis, and find that the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
the paper.      
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Table 6: Examination of the Change of Relation between Underwriter Reputation  
and Earnings Management by IPO Firms over the Internet Bubble Period 
This table reports results of the change in relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management over the Internet 
Bubble period. The dependent variable is DACC that stands for discretionary accruals in the year of the IPO scaled by lagged 
total assets. BANKER proxies for underwriter reputation and takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s underwriter has a rank 
of 8 or above on the Loughran and Ritter (2004) 9-point scale. AUDIT takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s auditor is a 
member of the Big Five accounting firms. VC takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists. Net 
takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the issuing date is between 1996 and March 2000.  BANKER*Net is the interaction term 
between underwriter reputation and Net. Off_Size is the natural log of total proceeds. Abstacc is the absolute value of total 
accruals scaled by lagged total assets. Incchg takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if current year’s income before discretionary 
accruals is less than previous year’s level. Loss takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if current year’s income before discretionary 
accruals is less than zero. Lev is the leverage of a firm and is defined as total liabilities over total assets. Industry dummies are 
grouped by two-digit SIC codes and have 48 in total.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels based on two-sided tests.  
Explanatory Variables Model (A) Model (B) 
INTERCEPT 0.136 0.158 
(0.82) (0.95) 
BANKER -0.040* -0.046** 
(-1.82) (-2.51) 
AUDIT  -0.001 -0.002 
(-0.05) (-0.08) 
VC 0.003 -0.019 
(0.20) (-0.97) 
Net 0.053** 0.023 
  (2.20) (1.20) 
BANKER*Net -0.011  
  (-0.38)  
VC*Net  0.052* 
   (1.85) 
Off_Size -0.044*** -0.044*** 
(-5.34) (-5.31) 
Abstacc -0.216*** -0.218*** 
(-9.14) (-9.23) 
Incchg 0.198*** 0.195*** 
(7.88) (7.80) 
Loss 
 
-0.022 -0.022 
(-0.17) (-0.17) 
Lev -0.034 -0.035 
(-1.11) (-1.14) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Adj. R-square (%) 7.59% 7.69% 
 
 
To examine the possible change in the roles of underwriter and venture capitalists in restraining earnings 
management by IPO issuers after the passage of SOX, we propose the following regression model:  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10
_
               +  ,                
it it it it it it
it it it it it
DACC BANKER AUDIT VC SOX BAV SOX Off Size
Abstacc Incchg Loss Lev Industry dummies
      
    
       
    
                 (7) 
 
where SOX is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the IPO took place in 2002 to 2005, and 0 otherwise; and other 
variables are defined as before. 
 
Model (A) in Table 7 shows that the coefficient of -4.1% for BANKER is significant at the 5% level, 
indicating that underwriter reputation lowers the level of earnings management of IPO firms by 4.1% during the pre-
SOX period. While underwriter reputation further reduces earnings management post SOX, the incremental effect is 
not significant as evidenced by the statistically insignificant coefficient for the interactive term, BANKER*SOX. 
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Model (B) in Table 7 shows that the role of venture capitalists in reducing earnings management is 
insignificant during the pre-SOX period. However, the statistically significant negative coefficient of the interaction 
term, VC*SOX, indicates that VC backing helps reduce the level of earnings management of IPO issuers by 14.5% 
(β3 + β5) in the post-SOX period when compared to that of their non-VC-backed peers. The result suggests that 
venture capitalists tighten their standards following the passage of SOX.  
 
 
Table 7: Examination of the Change of Relation between Underwriter Reputation  
and Earnings Management by IPO Firms after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
This table reports results of the change of relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management post SOX. The 
dependent variable is DACC that stands for discretionary accruals in the year of the IPO scaled by lagged total assets. BANKER 
proxies for underwriter reputation and takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s underwriter has a rank of 8 or above on the 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) 9-point scale. AUDIT takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO’s auditor is a member of the Big 
Five accounting firms. VC takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists. SOX takes a value of 1 (0 
otherwise) if IPO date is between 2002 and 2005. BANKER*SOX is the interaction term between underwriter reputation and 
SOX. VC*SOX is the interaction term between VC-backing and SOX.  Off_Size is the natural log of total proceeds. Abstacc is the 
absolute value of total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. Incchg takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if current year’s income 
before discretionary accruals is less than previous year’s level. Loss takes a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if current year’s income 
before discretionary accruals is less than zero. Lev is the leverage of a firm and is defined as total liabilities over total assets. 
Industry dummies are grouped by two-digit SIC codes and have 48 in total. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on two-sided tests.    
Explanatory Variables Model (A) Model (B) 
INTERCEPT 0.160 0.165 
(0.96) (1.00) 
BANKER -0.041** -0.048*** 
(-2.20) (-2.60) 
AUDIT  -0.004 -0.007 
(-0.14) (-0.27) 
VC -0.001 0.009 
(-0.05) (0.53) 
SOX 0.044 0.071 
  (0.86) (1.66) 
BANKER*SOX -0.087  
  (-1.45)  
VC*SOX  -0.154*** 
   (-2.75) 
Off_Size -0.040*** -0.039*** 
(-4.78) (-4.68) 
Abstacc -0.211*** -0.212*** 
(-8.93) (-8.98) 
Incchg 0.195*** 0.194** 
(7.75) (7.73) 
Loss 
 
-0.025 -0.023 
(-0.19) (-0.18) 
Lev -0.038 -0.042 
(-1.24) (-1.38) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Adj. R-square (%) 7.33% 7.51% 
 
 
 Overall, the results reported in Table 7 suggest that prestigious underwriters do not change their monitoring 
role in earnings management of IPO issuers either during the Internet bubble period or in the post-SOX period. In 
contrast, venture capitalists loosen their standards during the Internet bubble period but reverse their course after the 
passage of SOX. This may be due to changing objectives of venture capitalists over the course of the sample period. 
In order to take advantage of favorable market conditions with growing reception of IPOs through the Nineties, 
some venture capitalists, which have substantial equity positions in the issuing firms, are motivated to push lower 
quality, less developed firms public for realizing windfall returns on their investments in the IPO firms. According 
to the venture capitalist moral hazard explanation (Gompers and Lerner, 1998), some venture capitalists are 
motivated to go along with the earnings management of issuing firms in order to benefit from the inflated value 
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when they exit from their investments in the issuing firm soon following the lock-up period. This moral hazard 
motive of some venture capitalists may reduce the effectiveness of their role in mitigating earnings management of 
IPO issuers.  
 
However, as the market conditions turn tide following the burst of the Internet bubble, coupled with the 
change in the regulatory environment following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, an increasing number of venture 
capitalists become more cautious by selecting quality firms and better preparing them for going public. Further, in 
order to protect their investments in the issuing firms and their reputation for raising future private capital, venture 
capitalists may become more motivated to restrain earnings management of IPO firms under stringent market and 
regulatory conditions in the post-SOX period. This may explain the significant incremental monitoring effect of 
venture capitalists in restraining earnings management of IPO issuers in the post-SOX period, when compared to the 
pre-SOX period. As the direct interest of underwriters in the IPO firms is mainly gross spreads, changes in their 
monitoring efforts may not be as strong as that of venture capitalists across different capital market and regulatory 
environments. Hence, we do not observe significant incremental effects on the earnings management of IPO issuers 
for prestigious underwriters in the Internet bubble or the post-SOX period. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In the IPO process, underwriters play an important certification role by performing “due diligence” 
investigation. As credible certifiers, underwriters serve as the agent to help reduce information asymmetry between 
IPO issuers and investors. Prestigious underwriters have an incentive to restrain aggressive earnings management of 
IPO firms to protect their reputation capital and reduce litigation risk. Similarly, high quality IPO issuers with less 
earnings management tend to select prestigious underwriters to convey a positive signal to investors. This 
underwriter certification hypothesis predicts an inverse relation between underwriter reputation and earnings 
management of IPO issuers.      
 
Our study reports a persistent significant negative relation between underwriter reputation and earnings 
management of firms going public during the period of 1991 to 2005. Our results demonstrate that reputable 
underwriters, who serve as certifying agents, assist less informed investors in the IPO marketplace. Our findings 
support the underwriter certification hypothesis. 
 
Following the burst of the Internet bubble and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there are changes in 
the regulatory environment that discourage earnings management of IPO firms. We observe a reduction in the level 
of earnings management of IPO firms during the post-SOX period when compared to the pre-SOX period. Further 
analysis suggests that changing objectives of venture capitalists may contribute to less earnings management of IPO 
firms in the post-SOX period. 
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